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INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. Shumate, l a vexing issue in bankruptcy-law was whether ERISA qualified pension plan benefits should be considered an asset of the
debtor that should be included in the bankruptcy estate, and
thereby be made available to the trustee to satisfy creditor claims.
This problem emanated from interpretations of two important
subsections of the Bankruptcy Code. First, section 541(a)(1) provides that the bankruptcy estate shall consist of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."2 There can be no question that this broad language
was meant to include pension plan benefits as property of the

* Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University. LL.M. (Taxation),
1992, Georgetown University; J .D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974,
B.A., 1973, Syracuse University.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
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bankruptcy estate absent some other disqualifying provision
within the Code. The second part of this pre-Patterson analysis
required a review of section 541(c)(2) which states that a trust will
be excluded from the estate if there is an anti-alienation clause
restricting the participant's ability to freely transfer an interest. 3
In addition, this "anti-alienation" provision is required by the
Bankruptcy Code to be enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law."4
For nearly a decade a veritable judicial free-for-all developed
among the various federal appellate courts as to the correct interpretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law."5 Bankruptcy debtors had much at stake in this dispute since all ERISA
qualified pension plans by definition include an anti-alienation
clause, thereby raising the prospect that plan benefits should be
excluded from the estate. 6 Interestingly, there is a similar antialienation provision in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 7 which
raised even more questions concerning Congressional intent as to
whether pension plan benefits were property of the bankruptcy
estate.
Three case lines eventually developed delineating different
approaches to this definitional problem. Prior to 1991, the majority view held that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" should be
defined narrowly to mean only state spendthrift trust law. 8
Although this approach seemed at odds with the actual language
of the Bankruptcy Code, pFeponents were able to find support in
the legislative history.
A second approach achieved parity with the majority view in
1991. Decisions by the Third,9 Sixth,lO and Tenth l l Circuits posited that the majority view prior to 1991 was derived from an
improper reliance on legislative history.12 Proponents of this

approach

"
would
ing the
eluded
both sta

13.
Ct. 932
14. Id. ;
15.Id.
16: 29
17.Id.
18. The

3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a)(13) (1988), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988), contain similar
anti-alienation clauses.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
5. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (1988).
8. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
9. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
10. In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
11. In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991
(1992).
12. In re Lucas, at 603.
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approach held that had Congress intended to limit the meaning of
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust laws it
would have provided explicit language in section 541(c)(2) restricting the reach of the Code. I3 Proponents of the second view concluded "applicable nonbankruptcy law" certainly contemplated
both state and federal law and that this provision should be
accorded its "plain meaning."14 The obvious conclusion from this
analysis was that the federal ERISA statute must be viewed as
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," and therefore, an anti-alienation
provision in any plan meant that plan benefits had to be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate. I5
Another line of cases achieved the same result as the second
approach, but did so by relying ·o n the preemption clause contained in section 541(a) of ERISAI6 This section provides that
ERISA shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."17 Such
preemption provisions are contained in other federal statutes,I8
and according to proponents of this approach rendered any discussion about the inclusion of pension plan benefits in the bankruptcy
estate moot. I9 Under this approach state spendthrift trust law
was nullified by the preemption provision.
Finally, a third approach arose from decisions exclusively
within the Eighth Circuit. These decisions held that ERISA qualified pension plan benefits must be included in the bankruptcy
estate, and that the proper question was whether the benefits
could then be claimed by the debtor as exempt property under
either state or federallaw. 20
13. Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F .2d 362, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 112 S.
Ct. 932 (1992).
14. Id. at 364-65.
15. Id. at 365.
16; 29 U.S.C. § 514(a) (1988).
17.Id.
18. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provides in § 1305(a)(1) that the
states are preempted from enforcing any law "relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988). By comparison,
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TPCA) contains a provision
which expressly provides that state law which imposes intrastate requirements
more restrictive than federal law will not be preempted by the TCPA. 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(e) (Supp. III 1991).
19. See, e.g., In re Sellers, 107 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re
Bryant, 106 B.R. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
20. In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). See also In re Ridenour, 45
B.R. 72,77 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984), overruled by In re Leamon, 121 B.R. 974
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The decision ,in Patterson put to rest the ambiguity regarding
the treatment of qualified pension plan benefits in bankruptcy
proceedings. The Court relied heavily on the fact that the Bank~
ruptcy Code is fraught with specific references to "state law," and
posited that it is, therefore, inconceivable that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" should be construed to refer only to
state spendthrift trust law)!1 In the Court's view, a narrower conL'
struction of this language could only be supported by an express
reference to state law. 22
The result reached in Patterson is not as important as the
manner in which the Court dealt with the competing views. Given
that the opinion appeared to deal summarily with the opposing
views, why did it take the Supreme Court so long to take on this
issue? Also, how could the federal appellate courts have reached
so many different opinions regarding the meaning of the phrase
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in the Bankruptcy Code?
In the past, the Supreme Court has been less than forthright in
consistently following a "plain meaning" analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's language. In his concurring opinion in Patterson,
Justice Scalia pointed out,that in Dewsnup u. Timm 23 the Court
had refused to follow a consistent methodology in defining statutory language such as that being debated in Patterson .24 In Dewsnup, the Court refused to consider how a phrase was used in
another section of the Code in favor of focusing on its meaning in
one isolated subsection. 25
The Patterson decision left many questions unanswered.
Since Patterson dealt with ERISA qualified pension plans, serious
questions still exist as to the proper treatment in bankruptcy of
nonqualified plans, such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA)
and Keogh accounts. Participants in these plans clearly are, not
afforded the broad protection of Patterson, and they are left to
seek remedies in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, there remain serious questions about how the Patterson case
will square with potential issues raised under the fraudulent
transfer and voidable preference povisions of the Code. , Finally,

II.

(E.D. Tenn. 1990) (quoting H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136).
21. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992).
22. Id. at 2246.
23. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
24. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
25. Dewsnup , 112 S. Ct. at 776-78.
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there is the issue of nondischargeability of debts. Should ERISA
qualified plan benefits survive bankruptcy, will nondischarged
creditors be able to access the assets of a qualified plan following
the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding? These open questions raise significant issues of equity for participants in nonqualified versus qualified pension plans which would appear not to be
in keeping with the underlying policy rationale of Patterson .
To better understand the impact of Patterson, as well as
future debates regarding conflict between state and federal law in
the Bankruptcy Code, this article will review the underlying case
law that set the stage for this judicial showdown. Part II specifically analyzes the competing case lines which excluded pension
plan benefits from the bankruptcy estate. Part III briefly summarizes those cases which concluded that plan benefits must be
included in the estate but may be subject to exemption under state
or federal law. Part IV reviews the Patterson opinion in detail, as
well as the issues and analysis presented by the Court, and Part V
addresses the open questions that remain after Patterson .
Finally, some concluding remarks are. offered to summarize the
importance of Patterson in terms of its impact on uniform treatment of debtors regardless of jurisdiction, as well as the possibility
of future conflicts over Bankruptcy Code language given the
Supreme Court's reliance . on the so-called "plain meaning"
approach.
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INCLUDING ERISA PLAN BENEFITS IN THE BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE PRE-PATTERSON

Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
debtor's interest in a pension plan will not become the property of
the bankruptcy estate if two conditions are met. 26 First, the plan
must include an anti-alienation clause prohibiting transfer of plan
assets. 27 This is a mere formality when qualified plans under
ERISA are being considered since ERISA requires that an antialienation clause be included in any qualified pension plan. Second, the transfer restriction must be enforceable under "applicable
nonbankruptcy law."28 This presents the more difficult question
regarding the treatment of pension plan benefits. The construction of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is determina26. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
27. [d.
28. [d.
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tive of whether plan benefits are included in the bankruptcy
estate.
The majority view prior to 1991 held that the phrase referred
strictly to state spendthrift trust law, not to any other federal or
state law. Presumably, this meant that there could be no collateral references to ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code. This view
was followed by the Second,29 Fifth,30 Ninth,31 and Eleventh32
Circuit Courts of Appeals and presented a curiously limited interpretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcylaw." No sucll
limitation was specifically mentioned in the Bankruptcy Code, yet
federal appellate courts seemed. convinced that such a restrictive
view
was necessary. By following state spendthrift trust law,
.
these courts believed that the pension plan should place serious
restrictions on the participants' ability to control the fund assets.
These "employer settled" plans were distinguished from "self settled" plans which were ruled not to qualify as state spendthrift
trusts since the debtor typically had too much control over the
trust fund.
The decision by the Fifth Circuit in In re GofF 3 highlighted
the primary points of the ma,jority view. In Goff, the Court
reviewed the legislative HIstory of section 541(c)(2) and examined
the language which referred to spendthrift trusts. 34 This language provided that a "debtor's interest in a spend.thrift trust to
the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable
state law" would be · excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 35
According to the Fifth Circuit, the only logical interpretation was
consider
creditors

29. See, e.g., Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982).
30. See, e.g., In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. S ee, e.g., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
32. See, e.g., In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), superseded by
statute as stated in In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
33. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 578. The court defined a spendthrift trust:
In general terms, a spendthrift trust is a trust created for the
maintenance of a beneficiary, with only a certain portion of the total,
amount to be distributed at anyone time. The settlor places
"spendthrift" restrictions on the trust, which operate in most states' to
place the fund beyond the reach of the beneficiary's creditors, as well as
to secure the fund against the beneficiary's own improvidence.
Id. at 580.
35. Id. at 581 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 V.S.C .C.A.N. 5963, 6325).
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that this passage referred only to state spendthrift law and to no
other nonbankruptcy law. 36
In Goff, the court also analyzed whether Congress intended
pension plan benefits to be included as property of the bankruptcy
estate under section 541(a) or to be considered exempt property
pursuant to section 522.37 This approach was justified since section 522, the federal exemption provision, made specific reference
to pension plans, whereas section 541(c)(2) made no mention of
such plans. 38 According to the Fifth Circuit, this narrowly defined
the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include only appropriate state spendthrift trust law.39 Finally, the Fifth Circuit considered the question of federal preemption under ERISA. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that ERISA's broad preemption provision did
not extend to the Bankruptcy Code, or to any other federal statute
for that matter.40 For all practical purposes, the Goff decision was
limited in that it did not extend to all pension plans, but rather
only to those that were controlled by appropriate state spendthrift
trust law.
Before 1991 only the Fourth Circuit followed the approach
that would ultimately be adopted by th~ Supreme Court in Patterson. The so-called "plain meaning" view supported an interpretation of section 541(c)(2) that was not as constraining as that
followed by the then majority of appellate courts.41 In re Moore
held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" should be
construed broadly so as to include both state · and federal law. 42
Any restriction liniiting an analysis to only state spendthrift trust
law was overly narrow, and all that mattered was that the court
consider whether the plan benefits were subject to any claims by
creditors arising from any nonbankruptcy law. 43 The Moore
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36. Id. at 582. See also In re Brooks, 844 F .2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
37. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581.
38. Id. at 585-86.
39. Id. at 586.
40. Id. at 587-89.
41. In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 1477. See also In re Threewit, 24 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Karl. 1982); In
re Holt, 32 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); In re Phillips, 34 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D.S .
Ohio 1983); In re Rodgers, 24 B.R. 181 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982); In re Pruitt, 30
B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Ralston, 62 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
The Ralston court noted that "the term 'spendthrift trust' does not appear in any
relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code, in fact, it is not mentioned except in
reports of the House and Senate." Id. at 503.
43. In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
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court's analysis did not consider the legislative history even
though the Goff court had relied on it heavily.44 More impor_
tantly, according to the Fourth Circuit, section 541(c)(2) was not
vague or ambiguous in terms of references to state law. 45 Congress had been very specific in the Bankruptcy Code when it
intende~ to refer only to state law. 46 Such references were clear
and incontrovertible. Since section 541(c)(2) did not contain any
such reference, an interpretation limiting the scope of the provi. .
sion to state law was inconsistent with a complete reading of the
Code. 47 The "plain meaning" view increased in popularity in 199i1..
Beginning in January, four cases were decided by the Third,48
Sixth,49 and Tenth50 Circuit Courts of Appeals that evened the
split between the appellate courts and set the stage for a review
by the Supreme Court. The first case to follow the Moore opinion
was In re Lucas ,51 which was decided by the Sixth Circuit on January 14, 1991. Again, the facts were not materially different from
all other caseS presenting the same issue at the federal appellate
level. The Sixth Circuit, however, was somewhat more insightful
by making two very important observations. First, if the antitransfer clause of a qualified ERISA pension plan can be enforced
against a creditor, then such clause could similarly be enforced
against a bankruptcy trustee. 52 From this point, it was logical to
conclude that the ERISA required anti-alienation clause had to be
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as that term was used in the
appropriate Code secti"On. 53 Considering the inter-relationship of
three significant federal statutes, the Bankruptcy code, ERISA
and the Internal Revenue Code, the then majority approach could
not possibly reflect the intent of the statutory language. 54
The Sixth Circuit also addressed an issue not considered pre. .
viously by other courts. Specifically, whether the Internal Revenue Service could and would disqualify any pension plan where
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 1478-79.
Id.
In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.
48. See Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
49. See In re Lucas, 950 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275
(1991).
50. See In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1992).
51. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
52. Id. at 603.
53. Id. at 601.
54. Id. at 603.
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the trustee transferred fund assets pursuant to a court decision
interpreting section 541(c)(2).55 During the 1980's, the IRS issued
a series of private letter rulings in which it consistently took the
position that a court ordered transfer of assets to the bankruptcy
trustee by a trustee of a qualified pension plan, would trigger the
disqualification of the plan. 56 Although some observers doubted
that the IRS would take such serious action, there was no question that the consequences would be catastrophic for plan participants. Any plan assets distributed to a bankruptcy trustee would
have been taxable to the individual participants as ordinary
income. Further, the employer would lose a deduction for plan
contributions. Most of the primary tax incentives that led to the
creation of the plan would be lost. Regardless of whether the IRS
was simply declaring its statutory prerogative or setting the stage
for either judicial or legislative action on this matter, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the "plain meaning" approach was a more
consistent approach to solving this problem. 57
Following the lead of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in late
1991, the ·T hird58 and Tenth59 Circuits rendered decisions adopting the "plain meaning" approach. LittJe noticed at this time was
the fact that the Fourth Circuit had affj,rmed its decision in Moore
by applying the precedent in Shumat~ u. Patterson. 60 Although
there is no way to be certain, it seems :reasonable to speculate that
this issue was getting considerable attention and the even split of
eight circuits, following the state spendthrift trust and plain
meaning views, mandated a resolution.
It also should be noted that the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals had weighed in with yet a third view regarding the inclusion of pension plans in the bankruptcy estate. In the case of In
re Graham,61 the Eighth Circuit held that plan benefits were
includable in the estate, but became subject to potential exemp55.Id.
56. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-051 (Dec. 5, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-11-037 (Dec. 20,
1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-067 (Sept. 28, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035 (Dec. 9,
1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-29-125 (Mar. 30, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-31-020 (May 5,
1981).
57. In re Lucas 924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275
(1991).
58. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
59. In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
60. 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
61. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
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tion under section 522.62 This decision was premised on the
rationale that the language of the exemption provision was specific in delineating special treatment for pension plan benefits.63
This exemption approach had received consideration in a number
of bankruptcy cases 64 and those opinions revealed yet another
interesting twist in resolving the question as to how qualified plan
benefits should be handled ultimately.
III.

ERISA

PLANS AS

EXEMPT

PROPERTY PRE-PATTERSON

Under pre-Patterson law, a debtor whose pension plan benefits were included in the bankruptcy estate could still argue that
these assets were exempt property under Bankruptcy Code section 522.65 This section provides a list of property that is considered exempt under federal bankruptcy law and must be returned
to the debtor. A debtor is permitted to choose between this list of
exempt property and an exemption list provided by state law and
"other federal nonbankruptcy law," the only restriction being that
the state in which the petition is filed must have chosen not to "opt
out" of the federal exemption list. Section 522(b)(2)(A) provides
that debtors in these so-called "opt out" states may rely on state
exemption law, as well as any exemptions provided by "other federal nonbankruptcy law."66 In states that had not opted out of the
federal scheme, pre-Patterson debtors could claim a partial
exemption for pension benefits under section 522(d)(10)(E). This
particular provision limited the exemption, however, to that
amount "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
any dependent of the debtor."67 Under the decisions interpreting
this provision, debtors were not very successful in protecting the
full value of the plan. 68 Consequently, debtors in non-opt-out
states often sought to protect their full plan benefits pursuant to

result, did
section 522.71
number of

IV.
Patterson u.
whether
in the

62. Id. at 1273.
63. Id. at 1272.
64. In re Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
66. Thirty-five states have enacted statutes opting out of the federal
exemption list including: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia and Wyoming.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 522,(d)(1O)(E) (1988).
68. In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1981).
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section 522(b)(2)(A).69 They were, in essence, similarly situated
with those debtors in opt-out states who were precluded from relying upon the federal exemption list.
This situation led to yet another controversy relative to the
interpretation of Code language. Since section 522(b)(2)(A)
allowed debtors to protect plan benefits by looking either to a state
exemption list or exemptions provided under "other federal
nonbankruptcy law," they sought refuge in the ERISA statute in
order to protect maximum plan benefits. The argument was made
that ERISA constituted "other federal nonbankruptcy law" as contemplated in section 522, and therefore, the entire plan should be
exempt. Not surprisingly, most of the federal circuits following
the state spendthrift rule took the position that ERISA was the
type of federal law that could be applied by these debtors.70 These
circuits held that the legislative history's non-exclusive list of benefits and payments that could be exempted under other federal
nonbankruptcy law did not specifically mention ERISA, and as a
result, did not contemplate ERISA as falling within the purview of
section 522.71 This majority view was adopted despite a limited
number of bankruptcy court rulings to the contrary. 72
IV.

MANDATED EXCLUSION:

PATTERSON

v.

SHUMATE

On June 15, 1992, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Patterson v. Shumate,73 and in doing so ended the debate as to
whether ERISA qualified pension plan benefits should be included
in the bankruptcy estate. For all the conflicting precedents in the
lower courts, the Patterson decision was strikingly straight forward. The Court did not engage in-a lengthy review of the disparate viewpoints followed by the various courts of appeals, but
rather, chose to deal with these issues briefly in concluding that
the uniformity of treatment of pension plans was a key objective. 74
69. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
70. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 583-86 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Graham, 726 F .2d
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th
Cir. 1985).
71. In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 586.
72. In l'e Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
73. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
74. Id. at 2250. The Court stated:
Finally, our holding furthers another important policy underlying
ERISA: uniform national treatment of pension benefits ... Constnling
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include federal law insures that the
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Patterson involved a pension plan operated by the Coleman
Furniture Company. Coleman's plan had approximately four
hundred participants and was qualified under ERISA. One of the
participants, and the respondent in Patterson, was John B. Shumate, a thirty year employee of the firm who eventually rose to the,
position of president and chairman of the corporate board. 75
By the early 1980's, Coleman was experiencing serious financial difficulties which led to the filing of a Chapter Eleven reorgan-'
ization petition.76 The firm was unable to satisfactorily meet the
requirements of reorganization, and ultimately its case was converted to a Chapter Seven liquidation with Roy V. Creasy serving
as trustee. 77 During this same time period, Shumate's personal
financial condition worsened, and he was forced to file for protection under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
His case also was converted to a Chapter Seven liquidation with
John R. Patterson being appointed as trustee. 78 Creasy was the
first to take action regarding Coleman's pension plan. Creasy terminated the plan according to court order, provided for liquidation ,
of assets, and made complete distributions to all plan participants
with the exception of Shumate. 79 At that point Patterson took an
security of a debtor's pension benefits will be governed by ERISA, not
left to the vagaries of state spendthrift law.

Id.

the surplus or
estate.
80. ....a1·~."'·oMI
Proceeding for
pursuant 11
Shumate's
Brief at 8, and
81. Id. It

75. Id. at 2245. Shumate controlled 96% of all issued and outstanding stock
at Coleman Furniture Company. He owned 54% outright and controlled another
42% through a revocable trust, which he had set up as settlor and was also acting
as trustee. Eventually, he revoked the trust in order to own 96% of Coleman's
stock outright. Brief for the Petitioner at 5 (hereinafter referred to as
"Petitioner's Brief'). Patterson, acting as Shumate's bankruptcy trustee, also
emphasized that as Coleman's majority stockholder, Shumate was in a position
to replace the entire Board of Directors and that the Board could terminate the
company's Plan at will and without cause. Id. at 5-6. This argument was relied
upon at the district court level, which held that "Shumate could have terminated
the plan at any time before the bankruptcy and received not only his pension
interest, but any excess funds not needed to satisfy the rights of other
participants." Id. at 6.
76. Id. The Chapter Eleven petition was filed on November 3, 1982. Brief of
Respondent at 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent's Brief').
77. Id. There is some disagreement as to whether the Chapter Seven
conversion occurred in February 1983, see Petitioner's Brief at 6, or in November
1983, see Respondent's Brief at 2.
78. Id. Shumate filed a Chapter 11 petition on June 1, 1984, which later was
converted to Chapter 7 on August 24, 1984.
79. Id. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1985).
Since all participants in the Coleman Plan except Shumate had a distribution,
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adversarial position by filing an action to protect and recover Shumate's interest in the plan. 80 This action was filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia and was coupled
with a request made to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia as part of a related proceeding over
which the latter court had jurisdiction. 81 In the district court proceeding, Patterson requested an order compelling Creasy to pay
the plan benefits over to him; Subsequently, both actions were
consolidated in district court. 82
Shumate contended that his Plan interest had to be excluded
from his bankruptcy estate. However, the district court ruled that
the reference in Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) to "nonbankruptcy law" included only state law and not federallaw. 83 Shumate's interest was reviewed in accordance with Virginia case law
to determine if it could be termed a spendthrift trust, thereby
qualifying for protection. The court concluded that it did not, and
similarly disposed of Shumate's alternative argument that his
Plan interest was to be treated as exempt property pursuant to
section 522(b)(2)(A).84 Creasy was finally directed to pay Shumate's plan interest over to Patterson on behalf of the individual
bankruptcy estate. An appeal from this decision was taken to the
Fourth Circuit. 85
the surplus or "plan reversion" was paid over to the Company's bankruptcy
estate. Petitioner's Brief at 8.
80. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 (1992). The Adversary
Proceeding for turnover was filed in Bankruptcy Court on April 24, 1987,
pursuant lIU.S.C. § 542. This "Turnover Action" was instituted to secure
Shumate's plan benefits for his personal bankruptcy estate. See Petitioner's
Brief at 8, and Respondent's Brief at 3.
81. [d. It was agreed by Shumate, Patterson, and Creasy, that Shumate's
interest in the Plan was valued at $250,000. This agreement subsequently was
approved by court order dated December 3, 1987. Respondent's Brief at 3.
82. [d. The district court agreed to hear all matters relating to the disposition
of Shumate's company plan benefits. Petitioner's Brief at 8.
83. [d. The memorandum opinion was issued on February 29, 1988.
84. [d. See generally Petitioner's Brief at 10-13. Since Virginia had opted out
of the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme, the district court held that
ERISA was not intended to be a federal exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(2).
85 . [d. Patterson filed a motion for disbursement and final order before the
district court which was granted on September 2, 1988. The order directed the
payment of Shumate's Plan interest to Patterson to be used for the benefit of
Shumate's creditors. See Respondent's Brief at 4. The district court's decision in
the bankruptcy estate was premised on the argument that Shumate's control
over the pension plan was so pervasive so as not to qualify it as a spendthrift
trust under Virginia state law. 83 B.R. 404. Additionally, the benefits were not
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Subsequent to the district court's decision, but prior to the
appeal being heard by a Fourth Circuit panel, the circuit issued its
decision in the Moore case. As discussed above, Moore held that
any qualified plan which includes a non-alienation provision, by
definition, constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law." This
"plain meaning" interpretation was premised on the notion that
such plans necessarily include restrictions on the transfer of participants' interests, and therefore, inclusion of plan interests ··
the bankruptcy estate is prohibited. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit relying upon Moore held that Shumate's plan interest came
under the purview of section 541(c)(2) and should be properly
excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 86 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address this important bankruptcy issue and
to end the controversy that existed amongst the circuit courts of
appeals.
The Supreme Court carefully framed the issues in the case
around the proper definition to be accorded the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of determining the exclusion
question under section 541(c)(2).87 From the beginning of its opinion, the Court stressed the importance of looking to the plain language of the statute. 88 Read in a straightforward fashion, section
541 does not suggest that there is any limitation on "applicable
nonbankruptcy law," and certainly no restriction that it be limited
to only state law.89 The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code

In

exempt under § 522 (b)(2)(A) since the Plan benefits were not "exempt under
federal law." Id. at 410. See supra note 75 for discussion of Shumate's
controlling stock interest in the company.
86. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242; 2245 (1992). The Fourth Circutt
stated:
We see no reason to restrict § 541(c)(2),s exclusion provision to
spendthrift trusts. Instead, following the rule that, whenever possible,
statutes should be read in harmony and not in conflict, . .. we interpret
these in such a way as to give full effect to both ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code by holding that interests in ERISA-qualified pension
plans are excluded from a bankrupt's estate.
Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See
also In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. 112 S. Ct. at 2246. The Court expressly stated that it had granted
certiorari "to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals" relative to the
exclusion question. Id.
88. Id. Petitioner Patterson took issue with the "plain meaning" argument
stating that such an approach contradicts the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
89. Id. The Moore· court framed this question very succinctly: "'Applicable
nonbankruptcy law' means precisely what it says: all laws, state and federal,
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makes numerous references to "state law" in various sections, and
had the drafters intended such a limitation in section 541(c)(2),
they would have so stated. 90 In fact, the absence of such language
gave the clear impression that Congress intended that debtors be
allowed to look to both state and federal law in determining what
constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law."91 Consequently, the
Court concluded its analysis of the trustee petitioner's first argument by stating that ERISA was butane example of federal law to
which the questioned phrase was referring, and given the clarity
of the Code section being evaluated, there was no choice but to
"enforce the statute according to its terms."92
At this point it was clear that the Court had determined that
under its plain meaning section 541 could not be restricted or limited to state law. Without referring to the split in the circuit
courts of appeals, the Court made it clear that the majority view,
limiting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust
law, would no longer be followed. Having disposed of petitioner's
first argument, the Court next focused on whether the plan in
question contained an anti-alienation provision comporting with
ERISA section 541(c)(2).93 This section states that a "pension
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not
be assigned or alienated."94 The applicable Internal Hevenue
Code section similarly states that a "trust shall not constitute a
qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such

I
1

,I
I

under which a transfer restriction is enforceable. Nothing in the phrase
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' ... suggests that the phrase refers exclusively to
state law." In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476,1477-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (cited in Shumate
v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 364 (4th Cir. 1991». -See also Petitioner's Brief at 2526. The Petitioner also urged the Supreme Court to read the Bankruptcy Code
statute as "a whole and not in isolated parts." Id. at 26 (citing United States v.
Morton, 467 U.S. 826 (1984».
90. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2246. The legislative history of
§ 541(c)(2) is not dispositive of this question as the term "state law" is not
mentioned. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (19'77), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869.
91. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992). The Court cited
several court decisions where "applicable nonbankruptcy law" has been
construed to include both state and federal law. This observation was in accord
"with prevailing interpretations of that phrase as it appears elsewhere in the
Code." Id. at 2247 n.2.
92. Id. at 2247 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. , 489 U.S. 235,
241, (1989».
93. Patterson, 112 S; Ct. at 2247 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1».
94.Id.
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trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may
not be assigned or alienated."95 Shumate's qualified plan includ.ed
the provision that a participant's benefit, right or interest shall
not be "subject to alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge
encumbrance or charge, seizure, attachment or other legal, equi:
table or other process."96 The Court took notice of the ERISA seetion which requires that plan trustees discharge their duties ion
conformance with the do.c uments governing the plan, and' cCi)l!l:_
cluded that the transfer ·restriction in question was mOre tna'lil
adequate to constitute an enforceable transfer restriction pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2).97
The Court then dealt with three additional argUInelitts
presented by the petitioner challenging the conclusion that qualified pension plan benefits should be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate. First, petitioner contended that the legislative history of
section 541(c)(2) was replete with quotes reflecting an unmistakable intent on the part of Congress to limit the exclusion or plan
benefits to those qualifying as state spendthrift trusts. 98 However, these references were reviewed by the majority and termed
"meager" relative to supporting petitioner's claim. 99 Petitioner
next argued that any decision to exclude plan benefits from the
estate in a wholesale fashion would render the exemption provision contained in section 522(d)(10) meaningless. lOo This provision states that a debtor electing to use the federal exemption list
in section 522 may exempt f(.,Om the estate any right to receive "a
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract."lOl As mentioned previously, this exem:ption option is limited to those amounts necessary to provide reasonably necessary support to the debtor and the debtor's
dependents. 102
The Court refused to accept this argument on the theory that
the exemption provision was written much more broadly than the
anti-alienation exclusion in section 541(c)(2).103 The exemption
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95. [d. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)).
96. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (1992) (citing Article 16.1.of
Coleman's plan).
97. [d. at 2247-48.
98. [d. at 2248.
99. [d.
100. [d. at 2248-49.
101. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992).
102. [d.
103. [d.

I
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provision permits the debtor to exempt rights in both qualified
and nonqualified plan benefits, whereas the anti-transfer exclusion is limited to those ERISA qualified plans containing the
required restrictive clauses. l04 Finally, the Court dismissed the
argument that its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code would
frustrate a broader policy of insuring that the bankruptcy estate
casts a wide net in capturing the debtor's assets. 105 Justice Black"mun rejected petitioner's interpretation given the plain meaning
of the sections in dispute. l06 To the contrary, the Court's opinion
was consistent with previous cases in which it had "declined to
recognize any exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provision
outside the bankruptcy context."107 Further, the Court's adoption
of the plain meaning view would provide appropriate support to
ERISA's broad goal of protecting pension plan benefits, as well as
the overriding policy of insuring an "uniform national treatment
of pension benefits."108
V.
A.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AFTER

PATTERSON

Nonqualified Pension Plans

The Patterson decision gives every appearance of finally putting to rest the question of how qualified pension plan benefits are
to be handled in bankruptcy proceedings. There is general
acknowledgement that the decision will govern a large percentage
of corporate retirement plans. However, the pension plan at issue
in Patterson included over four hundred employees and was not
specifically designed to serve as a "top heavy" ,plan benefitting
only one or just a few highly compensated individuals. The Patterson plan was in all respects a traditional "qualified" plan as contemplated by ERISA, and the analysis provided by the Supreme
Court centered around the language in the ERISA statute which
affords special protections to those pension plans meeting the requisite statutory requirements. l09
.
Unfortunately, many workers are heavily involved in pension
plans that fall outside the umbrella of ERISA. These plans
include Keogh plans or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA),
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

[d.
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992).
[d.
[d. at 2050.
[d.
[d. at 2245.
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which are quite popular with self-employed individuals and are
"self settled" in that the grantor of the trust is also the beneficiary.
In either case, the pensioner faces the prospect that these nonqualified pension plan benefits will not be covered by Patterson
because these trusts do not include an anti-alienation provision as
required by ERISA. As a result, a serious unanswered. questiolili
following Patterson concerns the treatment of nonqualified pension plan benefits as property of the bankruptcy estate. 110
If Patterson does not exclude nonqualified plan benefits from
the bankruptcy estate, then the debtor must seek protection of
these assets under exemption rules. As discussed above, sectiolil
522 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a list of exempt property:
that is reserved for debtors who do not reside in "opt out" states.
Under section 522(d)(10)(E)111 the debtor generally can exempt
payments from a pension plan, ERISA qualified or not, "to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor."112 This obviously provides only partial
protection since the support requirement is subject to interpretation, and in any event, would not provide Patterson-like one hundred percent protection unless substantial support needs were
demonstrated by the debtor.
Absent support needs, though, the federal exemption would
be meaningless. It should also be pointed out that the protection
afforded by Patterson is irrespective of the debtor's need for support payments. Practically speaking, the federal exemption
requires that the debtor tap the pension plan for living expenses,
rather than preserve it for the intended purpose of providing support at retirement. As a policy matter, this result is at sev:ere
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110. ]In Patterson, the Supreme Court noted that a variety of nonqualified
pension plans do not include an anti-alienation clause as required by ERISA and,
therefore, would not be afforded coverage under the decision:
[P]ension plans established by governmental entities and churches need
not comply with Subchapter I of ERISA, including the anti-alienation
requirement of § 206(d)(1).... So too, pension plans that qualify for
preferential tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. § 408 (individual retirement
accounts) are specifically excepted from ERISA's anti-alienation
requirement. . . . Although a debtor's interest in these plans could
not be excluded under § 541(c)(2) because the plans lack transfer
restrictions enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law," that
interest nevertheless could be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(E).
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250.
111. 11 U.S. C.' § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
112. Id.
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cross-purposes with the Patterson decision, wherein the Court
noted that one goal of ERISA was to insure that "if a worker has
been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement - and if
he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a
vested benefit - he actually will receive it."113
If the debtor resides in an "opt out" state, the handling of nonqualified pension plan benefits depends on the wording of state
exemption law. States that base their exemption protection of
pension plans on spendthrift trust law would pose a serious problem to the IRA or Keogh participant. These latter plans are typically "self settled" and do not include the restrictions on the
beneficiary's ability to utilize or assign the proceeds that are
required in a spendthrift trust arrangement. This would leave
IRAs and Keogh accounts outside the protection of state exemption law, and thereby force their inclusion in the bankruptcy
estate.
Another consideration regardless of whether the state exemption law focuses on spendthrift trusts, is the possibility that any
state law exempting retirement plans from the bankruptcy estate
would be subject to preemption by ERISA.114 Even though the
ERISA preemption provision has been held not to apply to IRAs by
most bankruptcy courts,115 the debtor with nonqualified pension
plan assets bears the burden of ascertaining the consequences in
the state where the petition will be filed. This result is also at
cross-purposes with Patterson, since one of the reasons the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case was due to the wide disparity in the various Circuits that clearly had placed a premium
on pre-bankruptcy forum shopping by debtors with significant
sums in ERISA qualified plans. If such forum shopping by qualified plan participants was a problem prior to Patterson, then it
continues to be a problem with similarly situated nonqualified
plan participants .
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113. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (citing Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980».
114. 29 U.s.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Section 514(a) of ERISA states that the
statute shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id.
115. In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Ridgway, 108
B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In re Martin, 102 B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1989); In re Ewell, 104 B.R. 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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Fraudulent Transfers
Section 548(a)116 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
trustee has the power to avoid a fraudulent transfer by the debtor
of his interest in property, if such transfer was made within '~ne
year prior to filing the petitionY7 Under section 541(a)(l), the
trustee must prove either that the debtor exhibited actual ~ntent
to defraud, or that there were significant indications or "badg~s of
fraud" present to infer actual intent, and therefore, to estabhsn
constructive fraud. 118 In the latter case, courts generally . have
considered a variety of factors to establish constructive fqlUd,
such as: 1) the failure of debtor to receive adequate consideration,
2) the allegeq. fraudulent transfer occurring after the debtor's
financial difficulties have begun, and 3) the debtor continuing
using or enjoying the benefits of the transferred propertyY9 If
actual intent can be proven, either directly or by inference, the
transfer is voidable without a showing that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.120 Finally, a transfer is also
deemed to be fraudulent pursuant to section 548(a)(2)(A) if tne
debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value and was
insolvent on the date the transfer was made or became insolvent
as a result of the conveyance. 121
B.

"""JHH . ..

116. Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within one yea; ' before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily (1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that su'ch transfer was made or such ' \
obligation incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less that a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent . .. ;
(ii) . .. [had] unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) . .. would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay . ..
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
117. Id.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1991).
119. See In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988).
121. Although there are a number of tests used to determine whether'the
debtor received "less than reasonably equivalent value" for the alleged
fraudulent transfer, a detailed discussion is not necessary when considering prebankruptcy payments by a debtor to pension plan. This is due to the fact that the
debtor receives nothing from the trust fund in return, and therefore, would
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Given the context of the Patterson decision, what exposure
does a debtor anticipating bankruptcy have under Code section
548 when he purposefully makes significant contributions to a
qualified pension plan in order to avoid having the cash assets be
made part of the bankruptcy estate? The intended purpose would
be clearly to defeat creditor claims to the assets. Such transfers
could be attacked easily, and even if actual intent could not be
established, a good case for constructive fraudulent intent could
be made based on the factors noted above. This issue was not
addressed specifically by the Court, although nothing in the Patterson decision should be construed as overcoming this fraudulent
transfer provision. The problem with this potential argument is
, that it is policy based, and if one thing is made clear by Justice
Blackmun's opinion, it is that the overriding consideration in Patterson was to give "full and appropriate effect to ERISA's goal of
protecting pension benefits."122 Blackmun went on to say that
"our holding furthers another important policy underlying ERISA:
uniform national treatment of pension benefits."123
, In effect, in a battle of policy arguments, debtors can make
the case that the policy embodied in section 548 must give way to
that broader policy enunciated in Patterson regarding consistent
treatment of pension plans. Trustees and creditors clearly will
argue that a transfer deemed fraudulent under section 548 must
be construed as an exception to the Patterson case. However , in
the meantime, given the unce:r:.tainty that this policy exception
will be recognized, debtors would be well advised to engage in
some creative pre-bankruptcy planning by making cash transfers
to qualified plans and thereby force the courts to address the
issue.

in exchange

C.

Voidable Preferences
A similar issue is presented by the Code's voidable preference
provision. Under section 547(b),124 a transfer made within ninety

ne whether' the
'Or the alleged
considering prethe fact that the
herefore, would

always be construed to have received less than reasonably equivalent value for
the cash transfers.
122. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992).
123. [d. The Court stated further that its decision would ensure "that the
treatment of pension benefits will not vary based on the beneficiary's bankruptcy
status." [d. at 2249.
124. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
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days of filing the bankruptcy petition is voidable by the trustee if
it is made while the debtor is insolvent, it is made to or for the
benefit of a creditor in consideration for an antecedent debt, and it
results in the creditor receiving more than he would have h~en
entitled to had the transfer not occurred and had the estate beE\n
completely liquidated in accordance with Chapter Seven. 125 Most
importantly, the ninety day period can be extended to one year if
the creditor is an insider. 126
Once again assume a hypothetical debtor contemplating
bankruptcy has fallen behind in making payments to his or its
qualified pension plan pursuant to the plan agreement. The tr~st
becomes a creditor of the debtor and now has a claim that can he
considered to he a preexisting or antecedent debt. Having heeD
advised of the legal consequences of the Patterson decision, the
debtor makes a significant contribution to the qualified pensio:1!l
plan within ninety days preceding bankruptcy. Will the policy,
underlying the voidable preference provision prevail given the policy objectives of the Patterson case? The bankruptcy trustee
would argue that had the payments not been made, the pension
plan would not have received as much, and would have been rele-

gated to a pa:
ruptcy Code I:
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547(b),

(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date ofthe filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706];
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title [11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330].
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). An antecedent debt has been construed to be a
preexisting debt of a "liability on a claim." In the context of considering transfers
to a pension plan, the pre-bankruptcy payments to the fund would have to be due
and owing prior to the date the pet.ition was filed. A mere voluntary payment' to
a pension plan arguably would not come under t.he purview of this provision. ' Jd.
at § 101(11). Kallen v. Litas, 47 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988).
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gated to a payment under a fourth priority as detailed in Banlcruptcy Code section 507(a)(4).127
The debtor would certainly argue in this situation that the
payments fall within the "transfer in the ordinary course of business" exception to the voidable preference rule. 128 The critical
issue would be whether the debt had been incurred in the ordinary
course of business as that term is contemplated in the Code.
Although the Code generally envisions this exception being
applied to a more traditional creditor with whom the debtor has
conducted business, courts have considered factors such as
whether the debt accrued in prior course of dealing and was in
accordance with ordinary business terms. 129 Certainly, these
arguments can be made by the qualified plan trustee who would
ascend to the status of creditor once the required funding payments were not made. More importantly, the trustee could argue
that the court should never even reach the exceptions to section
547(b), since the pension protection policy of Patterson is clear,
unambiguous, and controlling.
A more interesting voidable preference issue is presented if
the above referenced debtor is a corporation, which after falling
behind in payments to the qualified plan, relies on an insider who
personally guarantees a promissory note payable to the plan. In
this case the argument is stronger that the insider is also a creditor of the debtor since any pre-bankruptcy payments made to the
plan would reduce the insider's p~rsonalliability on the guarantee. This exact scenario was presented in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Fin. Corp., 130 and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit held
that payments to pension plans made more than ninety days prior
to filing the petition could be recovered by the bankruptcy trustee
if the plan trust negotiated for and received a personal guarantee
from an insider. 131 In that case, the funds paid to the plan "should
be treated just like any other outside creditor"132 pursuant to the
voidable preference rules. This case has been followed by other
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127. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (1988). See generally In re Columbia Packing Co., 47
B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
128. 11 U.s.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988); In re Fulghum Constr. Corp., 872 F.2d '739
(6th Cir. 1989).
129. In re White, 58 B.R. 266 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
130. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at. 1200..01.
132. Id. at 1200.
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circuits 133 but openly criticized by bankruptcy courts 134 and Congress. 135 In fact, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Act 136 contains language in section 204 which would specifically
overrule the result reached in Levit .137 However, the practical .
matter is that the Bankruptcy Reform Amendments of 1992 have
not been enacted, leaving this Seventh Circuit decision intact.
The issue presented here is how will the Levit case affect the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to recover these guaranteed payine:dts' ,
under the voidable preference provision in light of the seeming
broad protection afforded qualified plans by the Patterson
decision?
133. In re Erin Food Serv., Inc., 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992); In re C-L Cartage
Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); In re H & S Transp. Co., 939 F.2d 355 (6th
Cir. 1991); Plumbers Pension Fund V. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S.930 (1990); In re Suffola, Inc., 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993); In
re Robinson Bros. Drilling, 97 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d
850 (10th Cir. 1989); Southmark Corp. V. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc., 9!;l3 ,
F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993).
..
134. In re Erin Food Services, Inc., 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992); In re C-L
Cartage Co., 899 F .2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); In re H & S Transp. Co., 939 F.2d 355
(6th Cir. 1991); Plumbers' Pension Fund v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.
1989); In re Suffola, 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, 97
B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989);
Southmark Corp. V. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc., 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.
1993).
135. In re Rubin Bros. FootweaF, liie., 119 B.R. 416 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In
re J.T.L. Supermarket Corp., 145 B.R. 4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Arundel
Hous. Components, 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); In re Performarice
Communications, Inc., 126 B.R. 473 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1991).
136. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, S. 1985, 102d Cong;, 2d ·
Sess. (1992), reported in 138 Cong. Rec. § 8241 (June 16, 1992). Senator Heflin
commented on section 204 of the Act:
This section seeks to overturn the Deprizio line of opinions begun in
Levit V. Ingersoll - in re V.N. Deprezio Construction Co. - 874 F.2d 1186,
7th Cir 1989. This case turned upon issues involving guarantees and
who may be considered an insider for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
The specific language of this section has received a great deal of
attention in order to narrowly but clearly overrule this series of
opinions. We believe that we have accomplished this task. The specific
language contained in the substitute bill which is before the Senate is
different from that which was reported by the committee. We believe
that we have improved upon the language which is reflected in this bill,
and that it accomplishes its task of returning the understanding of the
status of the law to that which predated the Deprizio opinion.
Id.
137. Id. at § 8242.
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According to Levit, an insider who personally guaranteed payment to a pension trust fund would be treated as any other creditor for purposes of the voidable preference rule, noting that the
ninety day period would be extended to a full year. This decision
clearly conflicts with Patterson and makes no distinction between
cases where the insider-creditor may have acted in good faith in
signing the personal guarantees. The practical effect of Levit is
that the pension trust fund would be in a prefer:r:ed p.osition if the
insider did not sign the personal guarantee, thereby iInplementing
the ninety day voidable preference period under section 547(b). In
any event, given the facts as presented in Levit, a bankruptcy
trustee could rely on this precedent to recover the pre-filing payments made to the pension fund despite the holding in Patterson.
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C.

Nondischargeable Debts and Rollovers

Assuming that a debtor has not made transfers that may be
subject to attack under the fraudulent or voidable transfer provisions of the Code, simply relying on Patterson to protect a qualified pension plan through the bankruptcy proceeding may not
deter some creditors from ultimately gaining access to the trust
fund. The Patterson case speaks only to the protection of qualified
pension plan funds during the bankruptcy process. However,
when a bankruptcy proceeding is terminated, many debtors are
still burdened with a variety of debts that are nondischargeable
pursuant to Code § 523. 138 This p;ovision applies to all debtors
granted a discharge under Chapters Seven, Eleven, or Twelve, as
well as hardship discharges under Chapter Thirteen.139 In any
event, the effect of the discharge is to allow creditors with debts
that were not discharged to pursue the debtor for collection. The
only requirement is that the creditor wait until the debtor is actually discharged so as not to violate the automatic stay imposed
upon the filing of the petition, which prohibits all legal actions
outside the context of the bankruptcy proceeding. 140
A debtor who has successfully negotiated the bankruptcy process and thereby protected her qualified pension plan must be
aware that plan proceeds are not immune from potential postbankruptcy collection efforts by nondischarged creditors, or by
creditors with debts accruing post-petition. This problem is of
138. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
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particular importance to debtors who, pursuant to the terms of
their pension plan, are eligible to make withdrawals from the
fund, have a right to assign any or all of the fund's assets, or have
reached an age where withdrawals from the trust fund are
mandatory. When this is the case, the anti-alienation clause does
not afford the debtor the same protection as discussed earlier,141
and the nondischarged creditor can assert a right to any share of
the plan's assets which the debtor could presently claim. ' T0
underscore the importance of this unsettled issue, the Patterson
decision anticipated such questions by including a footnote which
explicitly stated that this matter was being reserved. The Court
stated, "We express no opinion on the separate question whether
section 522(d)(10)(E) applies only to distributions from a pension
plan that a debtor has an immediate and present right to receive,
or to the entire undistributed corpus of a pension trust."142
The essence of this post-bankruptcy argument is that if the
debtor has a right to the plan's funds, regardless of whether she
chooses to exercise that right, the nondischarged creditor is legally
entitled to effect a collection action against that share of the plan's
assets. 143 Alternatively, the creditor may also initiate an action in
equity to for~e the debtor to make the withdrawal or assignment.
This may be preferable from the perspective of the plan's tnlstee
since it would be the actual plan participant making the request,
rather than the trustee repsonding to a court order mandating
direct payment to the nondischarged creditor. In this latter case,
the trustee would quite correctly be concerned about violating the
ERISA anti-alienation restriction and thereby jeopardizing the
trust fund's qualified status. 144 .
Pension plan participants must also be cognizant of the
unprotected status of IRAs and Keogh accounts, especially in the
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141. The anti-alienation clause contained in Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)
excludes pension plans that have such a transfer made by a trustee in violation
of this clause would risk disqualification of the plan. See supra note 56 for IRS
private letter rulings supporting this statement. Consequently, if a plan
participant's right to make a withdrawal from the fund had matured, or existed
pursuant to any valid claim under law, the trustee would not be risking the
qualified status of the fund by making the transfer. This would mean that the
anti-alienation clause could not successfully be used as a shield by the
participant and the fund trustee to thwart a creditor's efforts to force a transfer
to the participant.
142. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 n.5 (1992).
143. In re Reid, 139 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992).
144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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context of making a rollover contribution. Rollovers are often considered by plan participants in a variety of cir cumst ances. A participant having accepted employment with another company, may
want to terminate her retirement account with her previous
employer. Also, as was the case in Patterson, the employer may
terminate operations, either in or outside of bankruptcy, and liquidate its pension plan by making distributions to all participants. 145 Finally, the participant may seek to consolidate a
number of pension plans for convenience in fund management, or
to simplify annual withdrawals upon reaching retirement age. In
each of these scenarios, a rollover into a nonqualified plan would
strip the debtor of coverage under Patterson .
In light of the fact that Patterson protection will not be available, it would be preferable for debtors to leave funds in a qualified plan. The debtor should also consider t ransferring
nonqualified plan assets into a corporate qualified plan whenever
that option is available. However, it is important to remember
that post-Patterson nonqualified plans will be governed by exemption law. Therefore, if the debtor's state of residence provides for a
one-hundred percent exemption of IRAs, which would include rollovers from qualified plans, the debtor could consider this option,
keeping in mind potential violations of the fraudulent or voidable
transfer rules discussed above.
Rollovers in violation of fraudulent or voidable transfer r ules
could be reversed despite favorable "'s tate exemption law. However, the fraudulent transfer rules are generally applicable to
transactions where the debtor seeks to convert non-exempt proper ty into exempt property. In a rollover from a qualified plan to a
nonqualified plan, the assets are also exempt property as part of
the qualified plan and would arguably remain exempt property
once deposited in the IRA. A debtor could argue that the character of the property never changed during the rollover process, and
therefore, the fraudulent transfer rules do not apply.146
Rollovers present a policy problem similar to that discussed
wit h respect to fraudulent and voidable transfers. The treatment
of rollovers into a nonqualified plan depends upon the peculiarities of state exemption law. Debtors who live in states with less
than favorable exemption law may be able to achieve the same
advantage by establishing an IRA in a state that has the desired
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145. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
146. See generally In re Swift, 124 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
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exemption law, and preferably, where this question has already
been tested in the courts. Given these circumstances, in a bankruptcy proceeding the debtor could argue that in accordance with
conflict of laws principles, the bankruptcy court is obligated to follow the exemption law of the state in which the IRA is situated
rather than the law of the state in which the petition was filed. '
Once again, it is obvious that the Patterson ruling has left
open potential forum shopping and creative pre-bankruptcy plaFlning options that are just as significant as those that existed prior
to the Court's handling of this matter. However, planning opportunities that exist now with respect to rollovers are fraught with
potential pitfalls and dire consequences to the pre-bankruptcy
debtor if undertaken casually. Since state law varies widely on
the exemption and rollover issues, it is vital that debtors rely on
expert advice prior to effecting any such transactions, regardless
of whether bankruptcy is contemplated.
V.
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CONCLUSION

Prior to the Patterson decision there can be no question that
the various · case lines concerning the includability of qualified
pension plan benefits in the bankruptcy estate were contradictory
and irreconcilable. The Patterson case clarified this question in a
su~mary fashion, forestalling any serious conflicts with the IRS
that might have led to catastrophic consequences had any plans
been disqualified as the private letter rulings indicated. 147 Given
this potential result the question remains why it took so long for
the Supreme Court to address this matter. From 1982 to 1985 the
primary cases delineating the state spendthrift trust view had
been decided by the four circuits following this approach,148 while
after the Fourth Circuit's Moore decision six years passed before
the issues were addressed by enough of the other circuits such
that the "plain meaning" view achieved parity.
Perhaps the Supreme Court was hesitant to overrule a view
that achieved a seeming overwhelming majority status in such a
short period of time, and maybe it took the decisions of 1991 to
convince the Court that the time had come to settle the matter.
This is, of course, mere speculation, but the fact that the Patterson
opinion is virtually devoid of any substantive discussion of the telativemerits of the competing views, indicates that there was vir147. See supra note 56 for a listing of these Private Letter Rulings.
148. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
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tually no disagreement as to what the outcome of the case would
be. Only Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Patterson,
raised the question as to how so many appellate courts could have
reached any other conclusion regarding the interpretation of the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" than that reached by the
Goff court in 1983. 149
In the end, though, it can be said that Patterson offers significant assistance relative to the handling of qualified pension plan
benefits in bankruptcy, despite the serious questions that remain
unanswered. 150 The decision is an important step toward achieving the equitable and consistent treatment of debtors with qualifying plan assets that is a trademark policy of the Bankruptcy Code.
The importance of Patterson will become more evident when the
decision is harmonized with the other provisions contained in the
Code. Congress is already dealing with some of the issues
presented in this article, most notably the questions raised about
the treatment of nonqualified pension plans and their potential
interplay with the Patterson decision, as well as the insider-creditor issue presented in Levit. Under current legislation aimed at
reforming the Bankruptcy Code and which codifies the Patterson
result, the scope of protection afforded pension plans is expanded
to include many non qualified plans. 151 However, this is little consolation to debtors currently contemplating bankruptcy. They
must work with the Patterson decision and its attendant unanswered questions.
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149. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Shortly after the Patterson decision was handed down, the Supreme Court
considered the question of whether a governmental pension plan should be
included in the bankruptcy estate. See In re Leadbetter, 946 F.2d895 (6th Cir.
1991) (unpublished). The Sixth Circuit held that a state employee's interest in a
governmental pension plan covered by 26 U.S.C. § 457 (1988) had to be included
in the bankruptcy estate. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case
for consideration in light of Patterson. See Ohio Pub. Employees Deferred
Compensation Program v. Sicherman, 112 S. Ct. 2987 (1992). The Court had
noted in the Patterson opinion that this type of pension plan was not covered
relative to the manner in which the issues had been presented in that case.
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
151. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(c) (1991). See also H.R. 3804, 102d
Congo 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991).
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